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Abstract. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) led the way to new forms of 
communications, which extend today the Internet paradigm to unforeseen 
boundaries. The legacy industry, however, is slower to adopt this technology, 
mainly for security reasons. Self-managed security systems allowing a quicker 
detection of and better resilience to attacks, may counterbalance this reluctance. 
We propose in this paper a hybrid threat detection and security adaptation sys-
tem, designed to run on top of industrial WSNs. We explain why this system is 
suitable for architectures mainly composed of constrained or sleeping devices, 
while being able to achieve a fair level of autonomous security. 
Keywords: Threat detection, sensor network, security adaptation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The gain of maturity of WSN technologies accelerates their adoption in the indus-
try, and this adoption is all the quicker as WSNs answer to classical needs of industri-
al scenarios: physical values monitoring, asset supervision and facilities surveillance 
are all key requirements in these scenarios, for which dedicated sensors are available. 
However, even though cost effective devices and energy-efficient technologies and 
protocols are available, the underlying security question impedes the use of WSNs in 
the most critical industrial scenarios. The inherent vulnerability of WSN nodes, due to 
their exposed location and their use of wireless communications, is such that a WSN 
has to mimic all security features from the legacy Internet, while also adding specific 
use cases and taking into account the strong shortcomings of the WSN nodes. 
In this paper, we introduce a new Threat Detection (TD) system that is lightweight 
enough to be run on sensor nodes. We couple it with a flexible Security Adaptation 
(SA) system, which dynamically updates the security policies in special places in the 
network. We show that the use of this hybrid threat detection/reaction system greatly 
improves the resilience of the industrial WSN, without bringing in excessive energy 
consumption. The proposed solution is based on a partly centralized architecture and 
specifies new roles for WSN entities, in accordance with their status and capabilities. 
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Both threat detection and security adaptation raise issues with respect to their 
adaptability to WSNs. Threat detection challenges the constrained nodes' limited en-
ergy resources: it involves both costly [3] passive monitoring, and heavy signature-
based threat identification. Security adaptation challenges the inherent heterogeneity 
of a wireless sensor network: certain constrained nodes may be unable to comply with 
a new security policy. The sleeping/awake cycle of sensor nodes makes the operation 
of both security subsystems more complex, introducing desynchronization in it. 
A specific factor related to the industrial scenario is the WSN real-world topology. 
An industrial facility is made of multiple distinct zones, such as the external perime-
ter, the administrative building, the workshop and the storage area. All of these zones 
feature different sensors and are characterized by different criticality levels. As an 
example, Figure 1 represents a schematized industrial network made of a production 
facility and an office building, both being protected by a fence. Each zone is equipped 
with sensors of two kinds, relevant to the concerned area. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of an industrial wireless sensor network. 
3 RELATED WORK 
Roman et al. [4], define a threat detection system based on monitoring agents. They 
distinguish between local agents (able to process only the packet they actively for-
ward or to act as spontaneous watchdogs with a one-in-n probability, n being the 
number of neighbors) and global agents. Loannis et al. [5] also apply the watchdog 
behavior, with a higher emphasis on countering malicious monitoring nodes. Huang 
and Lee [6] propose an energy-efficient monitoring system. They select a single node, 
designated through a fair election process, to perform monitoring at a given time 
within a given cluster. Though, the election process is heavy for constrained nodes. 
To summarize, [4] and [5] misuse the watchdog behavior while [6] uses a costly 
election process, leading to expensive message exchange.  
 
Ma et al. [7] propose a Self-Adaptive Intrusion Detection System in WSN (SAID). 
Their approach does not take into the account the global view of the network, which 
may lead to incoherence. In addition, they propose to apply a new policy without 
checking if the nodes can handle it, which may be harmful to the network. Lacoste et 
al. [8] propose an approach that uses context-awareness for adaptive security. The 
context knowledge is combined with confidence and reputation metadata. The disad-
vantage of this approach is the expensive exchange of messages to maintain the co-
herence of the metadata. Younis et al. [9] suggest an Adaptive Security Provision 
(ASP), which adjusts security packet security processing based on trust and threats 
associated to routes. This solution is however too heavy for WSN. In addition, if a 
node that belongs to a route crashes, the route must be removed and new one will 
have to be computed. Finally, this solution is only suitable for routing security. 
Taddeo et al. [10] propose a method that permits the self-adaptation of security mech-
anisms. However, they always start with the highest security level, which could be 
costly for WSN nodes. Adaptive Security System (ADAPSEC) is reconfigurable se-
curity architecture for WSNs that has been developed by Shi et al. [11]. However it 
assumes both constant monitoring by each node and local inferring of new policies 
that the node should apply upon attack detection. Both would lead to high resource 
consumption. M.-Y. Hsieh et al. [12] base the WSN security on a trust management 
system. This approach delays the threat identification, though. 
In addition to the identified shortcomings, neither of the previous security adapta-
tion systems takes into consideration the sleep mode, although it is of paramount im-
portance in WSN: a sensor node spends most of the time in sleep mode, wakes up to 
collect information and push it towards a sink or server, and reverts back to sleep. 
4 SOLUTION DESCRIPTION  
4.1 Assumptions, Components and Roles 
The network is supposed to be divided into zones, each containing one or more sensor 
clusters. Zones and clusters have different criticalities, security levels and security 
policies. It is also assumed that the sensors in one cluster can communicate with each 
other. In addition, we assume that the awake time is negligible compared to the sleep 
time. Finally, we exclude any form of synchronization between nodes.  
The security system we present in this paper is made up of the following elements: 
 Threat Detection Client, which identifies threats and notifies the TD server. 
 Threat Detection Server, which chooses which sensor(s) will be in monitoring 
mode for each cluster by taking into account status parameters such as batteries 
level and available resources, updates the global network database, receives the 
alarms from TD clients and transfers them to the SA Server. 
 Security Adaptation Server, which decides upon threat identification which is the 
best policy to apply and stores the new policy in the security policy mailbox. 
 Security Adaptation Client, which regularly prompts the SA Server for new poli-
cies, and either applies them or generates new affordable security policies. 
 Inference engine, which deals with reasoning and allows for easy rule changes. 
 Security Policy mailbox, which stores the generated policies and delivers them at 
nodes request. The use of this module is required since the nodes are not synchro-
nized. It also reduces the overall bandwidth consumption. 
 Global Network Database, which contains a global view of the network and the 
threats detected in the past. 
4.2 Operation 
A node joining the network is in Bootstrapping mode. The newly joining node 
first sends a registration request to the TD server, informing this latter about its poten-
tial monitoring abilities. The TD server then registers the node and responds with a 
configuration message specifying whether it should remain in normal mode or tempo-
rarily switch to monitoring mode. The decision by the TD is based on its knowledge 
of current and, in some cases, foreseen contexts of the candidate monitoring nodes. 
This contextual information includes data related to the nodes resources (e.g. battery 
level), locations, and capabilities (e.g. number of observables neighbours). With this 
information, the TD server can identify the best node in the cluster for acting as a 
monitoring entity, and configure it with this role for a certain period of time. Once the 
monitoring delay expires, the TD server designates a new cluster monitoring node. 
A node switches to Monitoring Mode when ordered to do so by the TD server. 
The sequence of actions performed when in monitoring node is: 
1. When the TD Client detects a threat, it sends an alarm to the TD server that in-
cludes information about the threat. This information contains at least the IP ad-
dresses of the attacker and target(s) and the type of attack. 
2. Upon receiving the alarm, the TD Server reports it to the SA server, optionally af-
ter having aggregated multiple alarm messages and/or having assessed the quality 
of the evaluator. The SA Server then uses the inference engine to determine which 
policies have to be applied to counter the detected threat. Next, it stores the new 
policies in the security policy mailbox. Depending on the global state of the net-
work and type of the threat, a new policy may be wide-scale or local.  
3. In monitoring mode, the TD client on the sensor regularly polls the security policy 
mailbox by sending a dedicated inquiry message to the SA server. 
4. The SA server sends the requested new policy if it exists. Otherwise it replies with 
a message telling the node that it is not to enforce a new policy.  
5. If a new policy is received, the SA Client checks whether it can be enforced by 
checking the available resources and safety constraints. If it finds out that applying 
the policy would be too costly or would put the safety or workers/facilities at risk, 
it tries to find a trade off in the form of a less demanding security policy. 
6. The SA client configures the security services in accordance with the received or 
self-determined security policy. It then sends an ACK if the received policy was 
applied without change, or sends a descriptor of the locally generated policy. 
7. The SA Server receives the ACK or locally generated policy descriptor and up-
dates the global network database accordingly. 
The Normal Mode is the default mode for a bootstrapped sensor that has not been 
designated as a monitoring node. In this mode, the sensors alternate between active 
and sleeping states. Upon leaving sleeping state, the node interrogates the SA server 
about an eventual new policy to enforce. It then performs the task(s) for which it has 
left the sleeping state. An alarm may be raised by a node in Normal Mode only if one 
of the run tasks detects a threat and notifies the TD Client through an API call. 
The overall process of our solution, depicting its state machines and inter-
nal/network message exchanges, is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overall logical architecture and state machines. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper presents an adaptive autonomous security system for industrial wireless 
sensor networks that features both threat detection and adaptive security. Both of 
these subsystems involve semi-centralized processes. The switch from normal threat 
detection mode to monitoring mode is triggered by the threat detection server, which 
bases on regular reports from nodes and updates its decision accordingly. The security 
adaptation system relies on server-issued policies, but the last word on how to enforce 
these policies remains with the sensor nodes. This system is currently being imple-
mented for multiple industrial scenarios. 
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